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Pretrial Custody and Miranda 
Kit Kinports* 
Abstract 
In two recent opinions, Maryland v. Shatzer and Howes v. 
Fields, the Supreme Court concluded that inmates serving prison 
sentences were not in custody for purposes of Miranda—in 
Shatzer’s case while he was living among the general prison 
population and in Fields’s case while he was undergoing police 
interrogation. The question addressed in this Article is one that 
has divided the lower courts in the wake of those two decisions: 
the impact of the Court’s rulings on the hundreds of thousands 
of pretrial detainees in this country, many of whom are poor, 
Black, and Brown. 
This Article maintains that the Court’s language and 
reasoning in Shatzer and Fields, as well as the relevant policy 
considerations, call for limiting the reach of those opinions to 
prisoners serving time. This Article therefore concludes that 
pretrial detainees should be deemed to be in Miranda custody for 
the duration of their confinement prior to trial. Any other result 
would allow gamesmanship on the part of prosecutors in making 
charging decisions and bail recommendations and would enable 
law enforcement to trade on the coerciveness of pretrial detention 
to elicit unwarned confessions from suspects who are especially 
susceptible to the threats and promises that are a leading cause 
of false confessions and who disproportionately represent 
communities of color and financially vulnerable populations. 
 
 * Professor and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn 
State Law at University Park. I am indebted to Joshua Dressler, David Kaye, 
George Thomas, and Sam Wiseman for their thoughtful comments on an 
earlier draft of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, 10.7 million people were admitted to more than 
2,800 city and county jails in this country.1 At the midpoint of 
that year, those jails held more than 738,000 persons, about 
two-thirds of whom—490,000 individuals—had not been 
convicted of a crime.2 
While some arrestees are released quickly,3 others are held 
pending trial4 because they are denied bail or, more commonly, 
because they cannot afford to pay the amount of money bail 
 
 1. ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 253044, 
JAIL INMATES IN 2018, at 1, 7 (2020). 
 2. Id. at 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1058 (2013) (noting that many suspects are released 
after their initial arraignment, within a day or two following arrest). 
 4. See THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
NCJ 239673, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS, 1995–2010, at 2 (2013) (reporting that 64 percent of federal pretrial 
detainees were held for the duration of their case in 2010). 
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imposed.5 In the largest counties in this country, almost 40 
percent of felony defendants are detained awaiting trial.6 As one 
scholar observed, pretrial detention is “the single most 
preventable cause of mass incarceration in America.”7 
Pretrial detention comes with significant costs, and those 
burdens fall disproportionately on communities of color8 and 
economically vulnerable populations.9 Pretrial detainees are 
more likely to be convicted, and they receive less advantageous 
 
 5. See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS 
IN STATE COURTS 1 (2007) (finding that only one-sixth of pretrial detainees 
were denied bail and the rest were unable to post bail); Wendy Sawyer & Peter 
Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/J9YU-5LQK (noting that the median cash 
bail amount in felony cases is $10,000, about eight months’ income for the 
typical pretrial detainee). 
 6. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(i), at 16 (6th 
ed. 2017) (putting the figure at 38 percent of felony defendants in the 
seventy-five largest counties); see also COHEN, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting 
that the 2010 pretrial detention rate in federal cases was 84 percent for drug 
charges, 86 percent for weapons offenses, and 87 percent for violent crimes). 
 7. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE 
LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2018). 
 8. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF 
RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 6 
(2018), https://perma.cc/BQ3D-AUTE (PDF) (finding that Black and Brown 
defendants were more likely to be denied bail, charged higher amounts of 
money bail, and detained because they were unable to pay the cash bail); 
Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z5B3-NXV6 (reporting that Black 
and Brown defendants are at least 10 to 25 percent more likely to be held prior 
to trial and their cash bail amounts are set at double the figure for White 
defendants). But cf. BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 106 (concluding that the racial 
disparity disappeared after controlling for the likelihood a suspect would 
commit a violent crime, and in fact judges tended to detain White suspects 
more than Black suspects who posed similar risks of committing violent and 
drug crimes). 
 9. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 48 (noting that most detainees 
unable to pay bail are in the poorest third of the population); Sandra G. 
Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643, 1653 (2020) 
(commenting on the “widespread pretrial detention of the poor”). 
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plea deals and longer sentences.10 Pretrial detention can lead to 
loss of employment, housing, public benefits, and child 
custody.11 As a result, some detainees are pressured to plead 
guilty in return for lenient sentences or even time served.12 And, 
as a captive audience for law enforcement officials seeking 
information, pretrial detainees facing an uncertain future are 
particularly susceptible to the types of threats and promises 
that are highly correlated with false confessions.13 
During the past decade, two Supreme Court decisions have 
determined that inmates who were serving prison sentences 
were not in custody for Miranda14 purposes. In the first, 
Maryland v. Shatzer,15 the Court, in a 2010 opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, held that a prisoner enjoyed a break in custody 
when an interrogation session ended with his invocation of the 
right to counsel and he was returned to the general prison 
population.16 Two years later, Justice Alito wrote the majority 
opinion in Howes v. Fields,17 concluding that an inmate who was 
questioned by two law enforcement officials for somewhere 
between five and seven hours was not entitled to Miranda 
warnings because the interrogation was noncustodial.18 
The issue discussed in this Article is one that has divided 
the lower courts in the wake of Shatzer and Fields: what 
implications those two decisions have for pretrial detainees who 
make an unwarned confession while incarcerated awaiting trial. 
 
 10. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 82–85; THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, supra note 8, at 17; Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass 
Incarceration, 53 GA. L. REV. 235, 246–47, 250–52 (2018). 
 11. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 87; Crystal S. Yang, Toward an 
Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1423–28 (2017). 
 12. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 4; Wiseman, supra note 10, at 246. 
 13. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 
309 (2008) (concluding that “promises of leniency and threats of punishment, 
whether implicit or explicit, are the primary cause of police-induced false 
confessions”); see also GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS 
OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 220 (2012) (reporting that 
“[f]alse confessions are the third leading cause of wrongful convictions”). 
 14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 15. 559 U.S. 98 (2010). 
 16. Id. at 112–14. 
 17. 565 U.S. 499 (2012). 
 18. Id. at 514–17. 
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In exploring that question, this Article argues that Shatzer and 
Fields should be limited to inmates who are serving prison 
sentences. Pretrial detainees, by contrast, should be deemed to 
be in custody for Miranda purposes during the length of their 
pretrial confinement. 
In defending that position, this Article proceeds in three 
parts. Following this introduction, Part I briefly describes the 
Supreme Court precedent on custody, first tracing the variety of 
definitions the Justices have endorsed in the fifty-plus years 
since Miranda was decided and then focusing on the four 
opinions that have considered Miranda challenges raised by 
incarcerated individuals. In assessing the reach of Shatzer and 
Fields, Part II first addresses the increasingly pro-prosecution 
interpretation of precedent reflected in those four decisions and 
then analyzes the language and reasoning in Shatzer and 
Fields. Part III examines the relevant competing policy 
considerations, and the Article then concludes. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S CUSTODY PRECEDENTS 
A. Definitions of Custody 
The “tortured path”19 the Supreme Court has followed in 
defining custody for Miranda purposes has yielded various 
definitions over the years. In Miranda itself, the Court held that 
the combination of custody and interrogation triggers the right 
to warnings, reasoning that “no statement . . . can truly be the 
product of . . . free choice” when a suspect is isolated in “an 
unfamiliar atmosphere” and faced with the “compulsion 
inherent in custodial surroundings.”20 In defining custody, the 
Miranda Court made the somewhat circular observation that 
warnings are required whenever a suspect “has been taken into 
 
 19. George M. Dery III, The Supposed Strength of Hopelessness: The 
Supreme Court Further Undermines Miranda in Howes v. Fields, 40 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 69, 78 (2012). 
 20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58. Even if pretrial detainees are deemed 
to be in custody, they are not entitled to Miranda warnings unless they are 
also subjected to interrogation. This point is discussed further infra notes 
249– 256 and accompanying text. 
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custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.”21 
Seventeen years later, the Court repeated Miranda’s 
formulation in California v. Beheler.22 But Beheler then went on 
to say that “the ultimate inquiry” is “whether there is a ‘formal 
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest.”23 
The following year, in Berkemer v. McCarty,24 the Court 
again quoted Miranda’s custody standard but refused to give 
“talismanic power” to the reference to significant deprivations of 
freedom in the latter portion of the definition.25 Despite 
acknowledging that a traffic stop “significantly” limits a driver’s 
“‘freedom of action,’” the Court held that “routine” traffic and 
Terry stops are not “the functional equivalent of formal arrest” 
and therefore do not rise to the level of custody.26 In declining to 
 
 21. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court made the same point several 
times, see id. at 445, 467, 478, at one point adding the qualifier “at the station.” 
See id. at 477 (using the phrase “while in custody at the station or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”); see also Daniel 
Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 68 (1990) 
(pointing out that the Court’s repetition of the phrase demonstrates it was not 
used “cavalierly”). For other Supreme Court opinions applying Miranda’s 
definition of custody, see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per 
curiam) (finding that a suspect’s “freedom to depart” was not “restricted in any 
way” when he voluntarily agreed to meet at the police station, was told he was 
not under arrest, and left the station after a half-hour interrogation); Beckwith 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (concluding that a suspect who was 
questioned by IRS agents for three hours in a home where he periodically 
stayed was not in custody even though he was the focus of the investigation); 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (holding that a suspect was in 
custody when he was arrested in his bedroom early one morning and asked 
four questions). 
 22. 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). 
 23. Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). For other Supreme Court 
opinions applying Beheler’s definition of custody, see New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (concluding that a suspect was in custody when he was 
handcuffed and surrounded by four police officers in a grocery store); 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1984) (finding that a probationer 
was not in custody at his probation officer’s office even though he was required 
to attend the meeting and answer her questions truthfully). 
 24. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
 25. Id. at 437. 
 26. Id. at 435–36, 442 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444); see id. at 437, 
438–39 (reasoning that stops are “presumptively temporary and brief,” are 
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give Miranda’s language a literal interpretation, the Court 
asserted that “[f]idelity” to the landmark decision demanded 
that it be “enforced strictly,” but “only” in cases that “implicated” 
the “concerns” that underlay it.27 When the majority went on to 
apply Beheler’s standard to the traffic stop at issue in McCarty, 
the Court added that the officer’s “unarticulated plan” to arrest 
McCarty had “no bearing” on the custody determination because 
“the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the 
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”28 
The Court continued in the same vein a decade later in 
Stansbury v. California,29 quoting both Miranda’s and Beheler’s 
definitions of custody and then, following up on McCarty, 
pointing out that an officer’s “subjective” “knowledge or beliefs” 
are irrelevant to the question of custody unless “they are 
conveyed, by word or deed,” to the suspect.30 In making custody 
determinations, a judge must consider “all of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation” and those subjective factors may 
be one relevant factor, the Court continued, only if they are 
“somehow manifested” to the suspect and “would have affected 
how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or 
her freedom to leave.”31 
The Court further refined the reasonable person standard a 
year later in Thompson v. Keohane32 in ruling that issues of 
custody are mixed questions of law and fact that merit 
independent review on habeas.33 Given “the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation,” the Court held, the key is 
whether a reasonable person would have “felt . . . at liberty to 
 
“most likely” to end in the driver’s release, and are “substantially less ‘police 
dominated’” because they usually take place in public and involve only one or 
two officers (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445)). But cf. Yeager, supra note 21, 
at 68, 22 (arguing that Miranda’s “disjunctive use of the word ‘or’” signaled 
“the Court’s intent to create two types of custodial restraint” that constitute 
custody, and suggesting that Berkemer instead should have decided that brief 
traffic stops are only “an insignificant deprivation of freedom”). 
 27. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 437. 
 28. Id. at 442. 
 29. 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam). 
 30. Id. at 322, 324–25. 
 31. Id. at 322, 325. 
 32. 516 U.S. 99 (1995). 
 33. Id. at 102. 
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terminate the interrogation and leave.”34 The Court concluded 
that that objective standard can then be used to “resolve ‘the 
ultimate inquiry’”—whether the Beheler test is met.35 
Despite the Miranda Court’s efforts to devise 
“‘concrete . . . guidelines’” governing the admissibility of 
confessions that would provide “something more” than the 
amorphous totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness due 
process test,36 the Court has since admitted creating a “slippery” 
definition of custody.37 The totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach to custody has yielded “no bright line” for determining 
when a suspect is in custody short of a “formal arrest[]”38 and 
has led to the admission of a substantial number of unwarned 
confessions obtained through interrogations that were deemed 
to be noncustodial.39 
B. Custody and Incarceration 
Four of the Supreme Court’s custody decisions involve 
incarcerated individuals who were questioned about crimes 
unrelated to the reasons for their imprisonment. In three of 
those cases, the suspects were serving prison sentences, and the 
fourth involved a pretrial detainee. 
 
 34. Id. at 112. In subsequent cases, the Court made clear that the 
reasonable person standard incorporates the age of a minor suspect, “so long 
as the child’s age was known to the officer . . . or would have been objectively 
apparent to a reasonable officer,” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 
(2011), but does not include the suspect’s inexperience with law enforcement. 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004). 
 35. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 
1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). For another Supreme Court opinion applying 
Thompson’s definition of custody, see Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 663–65 
(concluding that reasonable judges could disagree whether the station-house 
interrogation of a juvenile was custodial). 
 36. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439, 442 (2000) (quoting 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966)). 
 37. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). 
 38. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 24.07[A], at 447 (7th ed. 2017). 
 39. See George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
1959, 1970, 1972 (2004) (reporting, in an empirical study of more than two 
hundred Miranda decisions, that almost half of the un-Mirandized statements 
were admitted because the suspect was not in custody). 
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The first case, Mathis v. United States,40 came two years 
after Miranda, and the Court held there that an IRS agent 
should have administered Miranda warnings before 
interviewing Mathis in the jail where he was serving a state 
prison term.41 In rejecting the government’s argument that the 
official was merely conducting a routine civil investigation, the 
Court refused to make IRS agents “immune” from Miranda’s 
requirement that warnings be provided to “a person in 
custody.”42 The Court was also unimpressed with the 
government’s attempt to limit Miranda to cases where the 
suspect is “‘in custody’ in connection with the very case under 
investigation.”43 Rather, the Court held, Miranda does not turn 
on “the reason why the person is in custody.”44 The Court 
therefore reversed Mathis’s conviction on the ground that his 
un-Mirandized statement should not have been introduced 
against him.45 
The second decision, Illinois v. Perkins,46 came more than 
twenty years later and is the only one of the four that involved 
a pretrial detainee.47 Perkins had been in a county jail for two 
days awaiting trial on aggravated battery charges when he 
admitted committing a previously unsolved murder in response 
to questioning from an undercover police officer.48 In finding no 
violation of Miranda, the Perkins Court added a third trigger for 
Miranda warnings—”‘interplay’” between custody and 
interrogation, meaning that suspects must realize they are 
talking to a government agent—on the grounds that the 
coerciveness Miranda was designed to alleviate is missing when 
a suspect “considers himself in the company of cellmates and not 
 
 40. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 41. Id. at 2–3. 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 4–5. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. 496 U.S. 292 (1990). 
 47. Id. at 294. 
 48. Id. at 294–95; id. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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officers.”49 A major theme in the majority opinion, which was 
repeated several times, was that a suspect who is speaking to 
an undercover official does not feel the same compulsion to 
confess because of “the fear of reprisal” or “the hope of more 
lenient treatment” at the hands of someone “who appear[s] to 
control the suspect’s fate.”50 
The majority opinion did not endorse the Solicitor General’s 
argument that Perkins was not in custody because the jail was 
an environment familiar to him,51 and the Justices implied that 
they thought he was “in custody in a technical sense.”52 
Nevertheless, the Court expressly left open the question 
whether “[t]he bare fact of custody” invariably requires Miranda 
warnings when suspects know their questioners are government 
agents.53 
Twenty years after Perkins, the third opinion, Maryland v. 
Shatzer,54 created a break-in-custody exception to the Edwards 
line of cases protecting suspects who invoke the Miranda right 
to counsel.55 In Edwards v. Arizona,56 the Court held that 
interrogation must cease when a suspect requests a lawyer.57 
 
 49. Id. at 297, 296 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Yale 
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is “Interrogation”? 
When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 63 (1978)). 
 50. Id. at 296–97 (“When the suspect has no reason to think that the 
listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his words 
are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners.”); see id. at 298 
(observing that Perkins “had no reason to feel that [the] undercover 
agent . . . had any legal authority to force him to answer questions or . . . could 
affect [his] future treatment”). 
 51. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 10–14, Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (No. 88-1972). 
 52. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297. 
 53. Id. at 299. 
 54. 559 U.S. 98 (2010). 
 55. Id. at 110. 
 56. 451 U.S. 477 (1986). 
 57. See id. at 484–85. For discussion of the conflicting signals coming 
from the Supreme Court, and the resulting disagreement in the lower courts, 
on the question whether Edwards bans only police conduct that rises to the 
level of “interrogation” under Miranda or forbids law enforcement from even 
approaching a suspect who has asked for counsel, see Kit Kinports, What Does 
Edwards Ban?: Interrogating, Badgering, or Initiating Contact?, 43 N. KY. L. 
REV. 359 (2016). 
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Arizona v. Roberson58 extended Edwards to ban questioning 
about all charges,59 and Minnick v. Mississippi60 expanded 
Edwards further to prohibit interrogating even suspects who 
have been able to consult with counsel after asserting their 
rights.61 More than twenty years before Shatzer, the Court had 
granted cert in United States v. Green62 to consider whether the 
Edwards ban on interrogation was eternal, but after oral 
argument the Court dismissed the case as moot when Green 
died.63 
In holding that the Edwards protection ends after a 
fourteen-day break in custody,64 Shatzer distinguished “the 
paradigm Edwards case” where an arrestee is “held in 
 
 58. 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
 59. See id. at 683 (reasoning that a suspect’s inability to “deal with” 
custodial interrogation without counsel is not affected by a change in the topic 
under discussion). 
 60. 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
 61. See id. at 152–53 (explaining that the lawyer’s presence during 
interrogation is key because a prior consultation does not protect the suspect 
from either “persistent” police efforts to induce a waiver or the “coercive 
pressures that accompany custody”). 
 62. 507 U.S. 545 (1993). 
 63. Id. For further discussion of Green, see infra notes 142–147, 167–171 
and accompanying text. 
 64. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010). But cf. Eugene L. 
Shapiro, Thinking the Unthinkable: Recasting the Presumption of Edwards v. 
Arizona, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 25 (2000) (discussing “the potential effect of 
coercive influences after custody is resumed”); Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 
22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 388–92, 401 (1995) (arguing that breaks in 
custody do not always suffice to dissipate coercion and proposing a six-month 
break-in-custody exception); Scott E. Sundby, The Court and the Suspect: 
Human Frailty, the Calculating Criminal, and the Penitent in the 
Interrogation Room, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 123, 157 (2020) (noting that the Court 
had not “the slightest pretense of an empirical basis” for its fourteen-day rule); 
Elizabeth E. Levy, Note, Non-Continuous Custody and the Miranda-Edwards 
Rule: Break in Custody Severs Safeguards, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 539, 569, 574 (1994) (pointing out that a second arrest could 
exacerbate a suspect’s fear, and suggesting that courts should consider not 
only the length of the break in custody but also factors like whether the suspect 
was able to contact an attorney and the circumstances surrounding the first 
interrogation). For a description of how the Court “seem[ed] to pull an unduly 
abbreviated fourteen-day cutoff out of thin air,” see Kit Kinports, The Supreme 
Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
375, 383 n.44, 389 (2011). 
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uninterrupted pretrial custody while th[e] crime is being 
actively investigated.”65 Picking up on the theme sounded in 
Perkins, the Shatzer Court reasoned that Edwards, Roberson, 
and Minnick “remain[ed] cut off from [their] normal life and 
companions, . . . isolated in an ‘unfamiliar,’ ‘police-dominated 
atmosphere’” where their “captors ‘appear[ed] to control [their] 
fate.’”66 
The Court went on to hold that Shatzer did enjoy a break in 
custody when, after invoking his right to counsel, he was 
returned to the prison where he was serving a sentence for an 
unrelated crime.67 Although acknowledging that an inmate’s 
freedom is obviously restricted, the Court viewed “the 
freedom-of-movement test” as “only a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition” for defining custody.68 The Court explained 
that inmates like Shatzer “live in prison” and “are not isolated 
with their accusers.”69 Moreover, their prison terms are fixed at 
sentencing, and the officials who question them have “no power 
to increase the duration of incarceration.”70 By contrast, the 
Court continued, for Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick, their 
“continued detention as suspects” depended on their questioners 
and they “confronted the uncertainties of what final charges 
they would face, whether they would be convicted, and what 
sentence they would receive.”71 
Two years later, in the most recent case, Howes v. Fields, 
the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that an inmate 
who is removed from the general prison population and 
interrogated about “events that occurred outside the prison 
 
 65. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106. 
 66. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456–57 (1966); Illinois 
v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)). 
 67. Id. at 113. 
 68. Id. at 112–13 (citing only Berkemer v. McCarty in support). But cf. 
Dery, supra note 19, at 81 (pointing out that this reasoning “equated Beheler’s 
formal/de facto arrest test with any restraint on ‘freedom of movement,’” 
thereby treating “two mutually exclusive tests” as “interchangeabl[e]”). 
 69. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. 
 70. Id.; see id. at 114 (observing that Shatzer’s “continued 
detention . . . did not depend on what he said (or did not say)” to the detective 
who first questioned him). 
 71. Id. at 114. 
PRETRIAL CUSTODY AND MIRANDA 737 
 
walls” is always in custody.72 The Court dismissed the lower 
court’s reliance on Mathis, interpreting that opinion as merely 
holding that inmates “who otherwise meet[] the requirements 
for Miranda custody” do not lose the right to Miranda warnings 
simply because no criminal investigation has yet begun or 
because they are in prison on charges unrelated to the 
interrogation.73 
Echoing Shatzer’s point that limits on freedom do not 
necessarily create custody absent “the same inherently coercive 
pressures as the type of station house questioning” that occurred 
in Miranda, the Court in Fields identified “three strong 
grounds” for holding that “imprisonment alone is not enough to 
create a custodial situation.”74 First, the “paradigmatic Miranda 
situation”—arrest and police station interrogation—creates the 
“shock” of “sharp and ominous change,” whereas “the ordinary 
restrictions of prison life . . . are expected and familiar” to an 
 
 72. 565 U.S. 499, 502 (2012). The Court reached this conclusion after first 
finding that the Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief under AEDPA 
because the state court’s contrary decision did not violate clearly established 
Supreme Court case law. See id. at 505–08. For the view that decisions like 
Fields that go on to rule on the substantive merits of a prisoner’s habeas claim 
are impermissible advisory opinions because “a decision on the constitutional 
issue can never have any independent effect and can never change the outcome 
of the case,” see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional 
Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 902 (2005). 
 73. Fields, 565 U.S. at 507. 
 74. Id. at 509, 511. But cf. Dery, supra note 19, at 85 (criticizing the Court 
for ignoring “the formal/de facto arrest test it had consistently employed from 
Beheler through Keohane”); David C. Berg, Second Circuit Review, Putting the 
Fifth Amendment Behind Bars: United States v. Morales, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 
455, 476–77 (1989) (challenging the view that prisoners must be subjected to 
some additional restraint in order to deem their interrogations custodial as 
inconsistent with Miranda’s “emphasis on psychological coercion and its 
de-emphasis on physical compulsion”); Maya Dominguez, Recent 
Development, “Custody” in Custody: Redefining Miranda Rights in Prison, 19 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1305, 1312 (2011) (likewise calling this 
reasoning “flawed” because questioning of prisoners “results in an 
incommunicado interrogation . . . in a police dominated setting,” and pointing 
out that, unlike other interrogations, “it is possible that no one other than the 
inmate and the interrogators know what is happening”); Michelle Parilo, Note, 
Protecting Prisoners During Custodial Interrogation: The Road Forward After 
Howes v. Fields, 33 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 217, 242 (2013) (arguing that the 
Court “minimized the violent and dehumanizing atmosphere of the prison”). 
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inmate.75 Second, one who is questioned at the station may 
cooperate because of “a longing for prompt release,” whereas an 
inmate will not feel the same pressure to talk given the 
realization that “he will remain under confinement” after the 
interrogation ends.76 Finally, the Court reiterated its 
observation in Shatzer and Perkins that a prisoner is aware the 
interrogator “probably” has no power to alter the length of 
confinement.77 
Although the Shatzer Court had pointed out that “[n]o one 
question[ed]” Shatzer was in custody on both occasions when 
detectives interviewed him at the prison,78 Fields interpreted 
that comment to signify only that the question of custody was 
“not contested” in Shatzer.79 Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding Fields’s interrogation, the Court 
concluded that he was not in custody when two sheriff’s deputies 
questioned him for somewhere between five and seven hours.80 
Without acknowledging that the conference room where the 
interrogation was conducted was not in the prison, but in the 
nearby sheriff’s department,81 the Court found “[m]ost 
 
 75. Fields, 565 U.S. at 511; see Laurie Magid, Questioning the 
Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for Incarcerated Suspects, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 929 (1997) (agreeing that, while a police station is “both 
unfamiliar and threatening,” imprisonment does not create the same 
“unrelenting feeling of isolation and powerlessness”). But cf. Dery, supra note 
19, at 88–89 (challenging the Court’s reasoning because it “inject[s] a 
subjective component” into the Court’s objective custody standard and risks 
creating “an underclass” of ex-prisoners and others who have had prior 
experience with law enforcement); Sherry F. Colb, Why Interrogation in Jail 
May Not Count as “Custodial”: The Supreme Court Makes New Law in Howes 
v. Fields, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Mar. 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/GF9D-V4G5 
(charging that the Court’s view of prison “as an unpleasant place where people 
nonetheless feel relatively safe and certain about their day-to-day lives 
is . . . far off the mark”). 
 76. Fields, 565 U.S. at 511. But cf. Dery, supra note 19, at 90 (arguing 
that this reasoning is a “dramatic change” from Miranda because it “shift[s]” 
to “viewing hopelessness” as an “asset” instead of a “liability”). 
 77. Fields, 565 U.S. at 512. 
 78. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010). 
 79. Fields, 565 U.S. at 507. 
 80. See id. at 514–15. 
 81. Compare id. at 502 (describing the conference room as located in a 
different “section[] of the facility”), with id. at 518 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that the interrogation took place “in 
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important” the fact that Fields was told he could leave and 
return to his cell.82 
With this background in mind, the next Part of the Article 
evaluates the reach of Shatzer and Fields and, in particular, 
their relevance to questioning of pretrial detainees. 
II.  READING THE TEA LEAVES 
Some lower courts have simply assumed without discussion 
that pretrial detainees are in the same position for purposes of 
the Miranda custody determination as inmates serving a prison 
sentence.83 The courts that have recognized the issue and 
directly addressed it have not reached a consensus: some have 
concluded that pretrial detainees should be treated like 
 
the sheriff’s quarters”), and Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 2, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680) (noting that the 
sheriff’s department was “adjacent” to the jail). 
 82. Fields, 565 U.S. at 515; see id. at 517 (placing special emphasis on the 
fact that the deputies told Fields he could return to his cell). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1028 & n.1, 
1032– 33 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying Fields); Holland v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 224, 
229, 237–40 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 
17, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying federal appellate court cases involving 
sentenced prisoners); United States v. Johnson, No. 15:CR:90-01, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 163438, at *2, *10–11 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2015) (applying Fields); 
Cure v. State, 600 So. 2d 415, 419 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (relying on federal 
cases involving post-conviction incarceration); State v. Ames, 155 A.3d 881, 
886–87 (Me. 2017) (applying Fields); Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518, 
526– 27 (Mo. 2012) (same); State v. Ford, 738 A.2d 937, 940, 943 (N.H. 1999) 
(relying on federal cases involving sentenced inmates); State v. Halverson, 937 
N.W.2d 74, 77, 88–89 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019) (applying Fields), aff’d, 953 N.W.2d 
847 (2021); cf. Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1245 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
federal court cases involving convicted inmates in dictum, but ultimately 
leaving the custody question open); United States v. Juan, No. 19-CR-4032, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175514, at *14 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 9, 2019) (distinguishing 
Fields, but solely on the ground that the pretrial detainee was not free to leave 
the officer’s vehicle there); People v. Hunt, 969 N.E.2d 819, 820, 828 & n.1 (Ill. 
2012) (citing Fields, but leaving the custody issue unresolved). 
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convicted prisoners,84 whereas others distinguish between the 
two groups of defendants.85 
 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that “the atmosphere of coercion” Miranda was designed to 
address was not present on the facts of that case); State v. Overby, 290 S.E.2d 
464, 465 (Ga. 1982) (refusing to distinguish “institutional custody pending 
disposition of [a] case” and “serving [a] sentence”); State v. Pehowic, 780 A.2d 
1289, 1293 (N.H. 2001) (equating “a person serving a prison sentence” and “one 
confined to a jail”); Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 283 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2017) (finding “no material difference” between sentenced prisoners 
and pretrial detainees, at least where the questioning involved an unrelated 
charge); Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 522, 527–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 
(discussing federal cases involving sentenced prisoners); cf. People v. Elliott, 
833 N.W.2d 284, 296 (Mich. 2013) (applying Fields and Shatzer on the grounds 
that a parolee arrested for a suspected parole violation is “no different than a 
prisoner who was never paroled in the first place”). 
 85. See, e.g., Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 416, 418 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding without analysis that a defendant being detained until trial was 
“clearly in a custodial situation”); Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 
1981) (finding that the pretrial detainee was confined and therefore in 
custody); United States v. Coles, 264 F. Supp. 3d 667, 683 (M.D. Pa. 2017) 
(interpreting Shatzer as “based . . . on the distinction between post-conviction 
incarceration and pretrial detention”); United States v. McIntosh, No. 
13-CR-18, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180318, at *17–18 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2014) 
(similarly distinguishing Shatzer); United States v. Hollister, No. 12-CR-0013, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131098, at *13–18 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2012) (same); 
People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 640 (Cal. 2019) (contrasting the reasoning in 
Fields); Trotter v. United States, 121 A.3d 40, 49 (D.C. 2015) (rejecting the 
lower court’s view that any differences between pretrial detention and Shatzer 
were “not legally significant”); State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 784 N.W.2d 355, 360 
& n.3 (Minn. 2010) (distinguishing Shatzer); Holyfield v. State, 711 P.2d 834, 
835–36, 837 (Nev. 1985) (reasoning that a defendant who is “incarcerated for 
any reason” is in custody); State v. Wint, 198 A.3d 963, 979–80 (N.J. 2018) 
(distinguishing Shatzer, at least for pre-indictment detention); State v. 
Jackson, 75 N.E.3d 922, 926–27 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (finding that the 
reasoning in Fields supported this conclusion), rev’d on other grounds, 116 
N.E.3d 1240 (Ohio 2018); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 776 & n.25 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2003) (explaining that the defendant was detained in jail and 
therefore “clearly” in custody); cf. United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 
406– 07, 409 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that the prosecution did not contest 
the issue of custody on appeal, but observing that the defendant 
“unquestionably” underwent custodial interrogation); United States v. Chitty, 
760 F.2d 425, 431–32 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding, without expressly discussing 
custody, that unwarned statements made to a psychiatrist during a pretrial 
competency examination could not be admitted at defendant’s sentencing 
hearing); United States v. Doe, No. 12-0052, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156186, at 
*25–26 n.11 (W.D. La. Oct. 1, 2012) (distinguishing Shatzer in a case involving 
immigration detention pending deportation); Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 
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In endorsing the latter approach and arguing that pretrial 
detainees should be deemed to be in Miranda custody for the 
length of their pretrial confinement, this Part of the Article first 
criticizes the increasingly prosecution-friendly interpretation of 
precedent reflected in the four Supreme Court opinions 
involving interrogations of prisoners and then focuses on the 
Court’s language and reasoning in Shatzer and Fields. 
A.  The Shifting Path from Mathis to Fields 
The conflicting approaches taken by the lower courts should 
come as no surprise. As this subpart explains, the Supreme 
Court’s concept of custody in the four decisions addressing 
Miranda challenges brought by incarcerated suspects has been 
something of a moving target. Some language in the first three 
of the Court’s opinions has seemed supportive of prisoners’ 
Miranda rights, but subsequent cases have progressively read 
that language narrowly. The following discussion considers 
those three decisions in turn and then looks at other Supreme 
Court opinions involving incriminating statements made by 
pretrial detainees. 
1.  Mathis v. United States 
Although the Court held that the IRS agent should have 
Mirandized Mathis before questioning him in prison, the 
majority in Illinois v. Perkins arguably cast some doubt on the 
reach of Mathis.86 The Court first distinguished Mathis because 
Perkins did not realize his undercover interrogator was a 
government agent and therefore the Court’s newly minted 
requirement of interplay between custody and interrogation was 
missing.87 The Perkins majority then gratuitously went on to 
leave open whether “[t]he bare fact of custody” necessarily 
requires a known law enforcement official to administer 
 
A.3d 1050, 1068 n.9 (Pa. 2012) (suggesting, without resolving the question, 
that Fields differentiated between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees). 
 86. But cf. infra notes 104–109 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
Justices seemed to believe Perkins was in custody). 
 87. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990). 
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Miranda warnings.88 The Shatzer majority completely ignored 
Mathis,89 but Fields gave the Mathis opinion a narrow reading, 
interpreting the earlier decision as merely rejecting the lower 
court’s view that Miranda does not apply when a criminal 
investigation has not yet begun and the suspect is imprisoned 
for an “‘unconnected offense.’”90 
But the Court reversed Mathis’s conviction outright on the 
grounds that his Miranda rights were violated, signifying that 
the majority must have thought he was in custody.91 As the 
dissenting opinion acknowledged, the majority “conclud[ed]” 
that Mathis was in custody “in the sense in which that phrase 
was used in Miranda.”92 
That reading of Mathis is consistent with the Court’s initial 
treatment of the case as ruling that the custody trigger for 
Miranda warnings was satisfied on the facts there. In Beckwith 
v. United States,93 the Court described Mathis as “squarely 
grounded . . . on the custodial aspects of the situation.”94 And 
Oregon v. Mathiason95 characterized Mathis as finding Miranda 
“applicable” to interrogation conducted “in a prison setting 
during a suspect’s term of imprisonment on a separate 
offense.”96 The Fields Court would later dismiss Mathiason’s 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Only Justice Stevens’s separate opinion cited Mathis among the 
Court’s custody precedents. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 126 n.12 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 90. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 506 (2012) (quoting Mathis v. United 
States, 376 F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
 91. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968). 
 92. Id. at 7 (White, J., dissenting); see 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(e), at 828 (4th ed. 2015) (pointing out that Mathis 
“assumed that a person serving a prison sentence is ‘in custody’ for Miranda 
purposes”). 
 93. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
 94. Id. at 347. 
 95. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). 
 96. Id. at 494; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.28 (1984) 
(citing Mathis as one of the cases “in which we have applied Miranda” and 
parenthetically describing it as involving a suspect “questioned by a 
Government agent while in jail”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 n.4 
(1984) (pointing out that Miranda is not limited to questioning at a police 
station and citing Mathis accompanied by the parenthetical “prison cell during 
defendant’s sentence for an unrelated offense”); Brief for the United States as 
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observation as dictum “simply restat[ing]” Mathis’s holding,97 
but, while admittedly dictum, Mathiason interpreted the Mathis 
holding more generously than Fields: Mathiason read the prior 
decision as reaching the affirmative conclusion that Mathis was 
in custody rather than merely taking the negative view that the 
lower court’s limitations on the concept of custody were 
unjustifiable. And, although the lower courts’ treatment of 
Mathis varied, some of them interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decision as adopting a per se rule that prisoners are in custody 
for purposes of Miranda, at least when questioned by someone 
other than a prison employee.98 
Moreover, the Mathis Court was perfectly aware of the 
arguments its successors would later endorse in Shatzer and 
Fields. The Solicitor General’s brief claimed that Mathis was 
questioned in “surroundings which had been familiar to him for 
twenty months” and did not experience any “dislocation” that 
might affect his “capacity to resist questioning.”99 In addition, 
the Solicitor General’s brief observed that Mathis “could hardly 
believe that anything he might say” to the IRS agent “could 
relieve him of any of the consequences of his State sentence.”100 
And the government urged the Justices not to rule that “an 
individual’s confinement, in and of itself,” constitutes custody 
 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 14 n.5, Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 
292 (1990) (No. 88-1972) (arguing that the Mathis opinion is ambiguous, but 
acknowledging that Mathis was in custody); Transcript of Oral Argument at 
16, Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (No. 88-1972) (indicating that the Solicitor General’s 
lawyer likewise agreed at oral argument that Mathis was in custody). 
 97. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 507 (2012). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Redfield, 
402 F.2d 454, 455 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); United States v. Cadmus, 614 
F. Supp. 367, 370–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Blyden v. Hogan, 320 F. Supp. 513, 519 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Holyfield v. State, 711 P.2d 834, 837 (Nev. 1985). For the 
contrary view that Mathis did not consider imprisonment per se custody, see, 
for example, United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1231–32 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1489–91 (11th Cir. 1994); Leviston v. 
Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 
970, 972–73 (4th Cir. 1985); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
 99. Brief for the United States at 17, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 
(1968) (No. 726). 
 100. Id. at 18. 
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for fear that Miranda warnings would become necessary 
whenever a government agent “seeks to obtain any information 
from an individual in prison.”101 
In addition, the three dissenters picked up on the Solicitor 
General’s points, maintaining that Mathis was in “familiar 
surroundings” and was no more in custody than a taxpayer 
being questioned at home or in an IRS office.102 Although the 
Court’s opinion in Mathis was “quite terse,” that may have been 
because the majority simply chose to give Miranda’s definition 
of custody a “literal” reading and “no restriction on freedom is 
more significant than incarceration.”103 Whatever the 
explanation, the majority was obviously unimpressed with the 
arguments raised by the Solicitor General and the dissent that 
would later gain traction in Shatzer and Fields. 
2.  Illinois v. Perkins 
In discussing, and distinguishing, Mathis, the Court in 
Illinois v. Perkins added a parenthetical leaving open the 
question whether “[t]he bare fact of custody” invariably triggers 
a need for Miranda warnings.104 According to Fields, that 
language reflected the Court’s decision to “decline[] to adopt any 
categorical rule” whether or not prisoners are in custody for 
Miranda purposes.105 
But the statement made in Perkins implies the Court 
thought Perkins was in custody when he was incarcerated 
pending trial on another charge.106 Moreover, the Court 
 
 101. Id. at 18, 21. 
 102. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 7 (White, J., dissenting). 
 103. Yeager, supra note 21, at 10. 
 104. 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990). 
 105. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012); cf. Bradley v. Ohio, 497 
U.S. 1011, 1013 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(noting that, despite the Court’s decision to leave the issue unresolved in 
Perkins, Miranda and Mathis “already answered th[e] question” because 
imprisonment “result[s] in a severe restraint on . . . freedom of movement”). 
 106. See Brief for Donovan E. Simpson as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 17, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680) (pointing out that Perkins 
did not “remotely suggest[]” that the holding that Mathis was in custody “was 
no longer good law” in cases, like Mathis, where a prisoner is questioned by a 
law enforcement official). 
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acknowledged that Perkins was “in custody in a technical 
sense,” and it criticized the lower court for erroneously 
“assum[ing] that because [he] was in custody, no undercover 
questioning could take place.”107 
Even if some ambiguity surrounds these statements, 
Perkins’s addition of the requirement of interplay between 
custody and interrogation supports the view that the Justices 
considered Perkins to be in custody within the meaning of 
Miranda.108 After all, if Perkins was not in custody, the Court 
did not need to add the interplay trigger and could simply have 
accepted the Solicitor General’s argument that the questioning 
was noncustodial because Perkins was experiencing only the 
“familiar” restrictions on freedom that are “a constant feature of 
prison life.”109 
3. Maryland v. Shatzer 
Although the Shatzer Court thought that Shatzer enjoyed a 
break in custody when he returned to the general prison 
population, the majority pointed out that “[n]o one question[ed]” 
he was in custody during two interrogation sessions in the 
prison.110 This statement arguably suggests the Court’s 
agreement with that view, but Fields later interpreted the 
sentence to signify simply that the question of custody was “not 
contested” before the Court in Shatzer.111 The issue was not 
“contested,” however, only because it was conceded: the State of 
Maryland expressly acknowledged that Shatzer was in custody 
 
 107. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added); see id. at 300 n.* 
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the case might well 
have come out differently if Perkins had previously asserted his right to 
counsel given that he was “in custody on an unrelated charge when he was 
questioned”). 
 108. See Dery, supra note 19, at 80–81 (observing that the notion of 
interplay was “premised on the existence of both custody and interrogation” 
on the facts of Perkins). 
 109. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 11, Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (No. 88-1972). 
 110. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010). 
 111. Fields, 565 U.S. at 507. 
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during both interviews,112 and the Solicitor General likewise 
argued that he “ceased to be ‘in custody’” for Miranda purposes 
when the first interrogation ended.113 
Moreover, the state and federal governments did not 
necessarily need to concede the issue if they thought there was 
an argument that Shatzer’s interrogations were noncustodial. 
In fact, an amicus brief filed in support of the State argued that 
Shatzer was not in custody during the second interrogation.114 
The amicus thought that Shatzer was in “correctional custody,” 
but not “police custody,” because there was no evidence he was 
unable to end the interview “at any time” and the detective who 
questioned him could not change the duration of his 
confinement.115 Although these were points the Fields majority 
would later make,116 the state and federal governments did not 
endorse them in Shatzer. 
The Court’s opinion in Shatzer also observed that the 
Justices had “never decided” whether “incarceration” satisfies 
Miranda’s definition of custody, and it read the Perkins 
parenthetical quoted above117 as “explicitly declin[ing]” to 
consider that question.118 Fields interpreted this language in 
Shatzer as “expressly” refusing to “adopt a bright-line rule” for 
 
 112. See Brief for Petitioner at 22, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) 
(equating Shatzer’s “[r]elease into the general prison population” following the 
first interview with “other types of release from police investigative custody”); 
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (arguing that 
the “cessation of questioning” at Shatzer’s first interrogation and his “return 
to the general prison population ended police custody”); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 6, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (quoting the State’s lawyer 
conceding that Shatzer’s second interview was “clearly an interrogation 
context”). 
 113. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 21, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (emphasis added); see Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 24, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (acknowledging that 
Shatzer was in custody when being interrogated). 
 114. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in 
Support of Petitioner at 31–32, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680). 
 115. Id. at 31, 25. But see id. at 31 (distinguishing “pretrial police custody” 
from “postjudgment correctional custody”). 
 116. See supra notes 76–77, 82 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 118. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112. 
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evaluating Miranda’s “applicability . . . in prisons.”119 But 
Shatzer was talking about “incarceration,” when inmates are 
among the general prison population “subject to a baseline set 
of restraints imposed pursuant to a prior conviction,” and not 
“interrogative custody,” when they are “taken to a separate 
location for questioning.”120 The Miranda protections are 
available to prisoners in “interrogative custody,” the Court made 
clear, but they “end[]” when an inmate is “returned to his normal 
life.”121 For Shatzer, then, the coerciveness of “custodial 
interrogation ended” when he went back to the general prison 
population, implying that the Court thought he was in custody 
prior to that point.122 
Each of the first three Supreme Court opinions to address 
Miranda claims filed by incarcerated individuals—Mathis v. 
United States, Illinois v. Perkins, and Maryland v. Shatzer—
thus included some language seemingly protective of prisoners’ 
Miranda rights. But by the time Howes v. Fields was decided, 
the Court had effectively backed away from that position. 
4. Other Supreme Court Precedent 
Even if Fields’s stingy reading of the three earlier decisions 
is plausible, Fields had already been convicted, and other 
Supreme Court opinions have held, or at least assumed, that 
pretrial detainees are in custody for Miranda purposes. In 
Estelle v. Smith,123 the Court ruled that a psychiatrist who 
interviewed a pretrial detainee as part of a court-ordered 
competency examination about seven weeks after the 
indictment could not testify at the capital sentencing hearing 
that the defendant was likely to be a future danger.124 The Court 
rejected the State’s claim that the Fifth Amendment applied 
 
 119. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 506 (2012). 
 120. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 & n.8 (conceding that “the duration of that 
separation is assuredly dependent upon [the] interrogators” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 121. Id. at 113 n.8, 114. 
 122. Id. at 114 (emphasis added). 
 123. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 124. Id. at 456–57, 468; Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Tex. 
1977), aff’d, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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only to the guilt phase and not the penalty phase of a capital 
trial.125 And the majority went on to find that the principles 
underlying Miranda were applicable to Smith’s psychiatric 
evaluation: he was in custody at the county jail, and, when the 
psychiatrist testified at the sentencing hearing instead of just 
informing the court of his competency findings, the doctor’s 
“role . . . became essentially like that of an agent of the State 
recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial 
setting.”126 
The Court has made similar assumptions about pretrial 
detainees’ custodial status in Sixth Amendment confessions 
cases. In United States v. Henry,127 for example, one of the 
“important” considerations informing the Court’s finding that 
an undercover agent deliberately elicited an incriminating 
statement from a pretrial detainee in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment was “the fact of custody.”128 Citing Miranda, the 
Court reasoned that “the mere fact of custody imposes pressures 
on the accused.”129 The Court has similarly described 
questioning of pretrial detainees as custodial interrogation in 
other opinions interpreting the Sixth Amendment.130 The most 
recent example is Montejo v. Louisiana,131 where the Court 
found that the Sixth Amendment did not foreclose admission of 
an incriminating apology letter the defendant wrote to the 
victim’s widow while he was being held without bond.132 
Although the majority rejected Montejo’s Sixth Amendment 
challenge, it remanded the case to afford him an opportunity to 
raise a Miranda claim on the ground that, if he had 
 
 125. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462–63. 
 126. Id. at 467; see id. at 468 (concluding that Smith had a right to 
Miranda warnings “when faced while in custody with a court-ordered 
psychiatric inquiry”). 
 127. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
 128. Id. at 270, 273 n.11. 
 129. Id. at 274. 
 130. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (“persons in 
pretrial custody”); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 309 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“custodial, postindictment setting”); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625, 630–31 (1986) (“postarraignment custodial interrogations”). 
 131. 556 U.S. 778 (2009). 
 132. See id. at 781, 797. 
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unambiguously asserted his right to counsel, he was protected 
by the Edwards line of cases and should not have been subjected 
to interrogation.133 
Despite the Court’s consistent assumption that pretrial 
detainees like Smith, Henry, and Montejo were in custody for 
Miranda purposes, the Justices’ track record in the four 
Miranda custody opinions involving incarcerated individuals 
indicates that they cannot be counted on to adhere to the clear 
import of the decisions in Estelle v. Smith and the Sixth 
Amendment line of cases. The discussion that follows thus turns 
to the language and reasoning in Shatzer and Fields in assessing 
their impact on questioning of pretrial detainees. 
B. The Language and Reasoning in Shatzer and Fields 
The Court’s opinions in Shatzer and Fields were drafted in 
terms of inmates serving a prison sentence and, on their face, 
therefore do not apply to pretrial detainees. In addition, the 
rationales the majority relied on to defend the conclusion that 
Shatzer and Fields were not in custody are inapplicable to 
pretrial detention. Those two decisions thus provide little 
support for extending their holdings to pretrial detainees. 
As noted above, Shatzer and Fields were convicted 
defendants serving prison terms, and language in both opinions 
repeatedly referred exclusively to prisoners who had already 
been convicted and sentenced. In holding that Shatzer 
experienced a break in custody when he was returned to the 
general prison population, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
mentioned sentencing and “incarceration pursuant to 
conviction” no fewer than eight times in the space of three 
pages.134 And the Court distinguished prisoners like Shatzer 
from the “paradigm Edwards case,” where a suspect is “held in 
uninterrupted pretrial custody while th[e] crime is being 
actively investigated.”135 
 
 133. See id. at 797. On remand, the state supreme court concluded that 
Montejo’s Miranda argument was barred because it had not been raised at 
trial. See State v. Montejo, 40 So. 3d 952, 957 (La. 2010). 
 134. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2010). 
 135. Id. at 106 (emphasis added). 
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The majority opinion in Fields followed a similar pattern. 
The Court’s characterization of its prior ruling in Shatzer spoke 
in terms of prisoners serving sentences on three occasions.136 
And in rejecting the lower court rule that questioning an 
incarcerated individual about events taking place outside the 
prison necessarily rises to the level of custody, the Fields 
majority used language describing inmates serving sentences—
referring to convictions, sentences, and parole—ten times over 
the course of only two pages.137 
Moreover, the Court was certainly aware of the issues 
surrounding pretrial detention, especially in Shatzer. The State 
of Maryland distinguished pretrial detainees from convicted 
prisoners both in its brief and at oral argument in that case.138 
The Solicitor General’s office drew the same distinction in 
briefing both Shatzer and Fields,139 though its brief in the former 
case suggested that pretrial detainees might be in a different 
position after they are arraigned.140 In fact, during the Shatzer 
oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Shatzer’s 
lawyer that a break-in-custody exception should not apply to 
pretrial detainees.141 
 
 136. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 510, 516–17 (2012). 
 137. See id. at 511–12. 
 138. See Brief for Petitioner at 24, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) 
(pointing out that Shatzer was “not in the position of a pretrial detainee”); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) 
(distinguishing Shatzer from those “in the pretrial detention category”); id. at 
60 (acknowledging that Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick did not experience a 
break in custody because “those . . . were pretrial police custody situations”). 
 139. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 24 n.1, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680) (distinguishing a 
sentenced prisoner from “someone held in jail on pending charges”); Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Shatzer, 559 
U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (differentiating between a prisoner like Shatzer and “a 
pretrial arrestee who . . . remained in continuous custody”). 
 140. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 20, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680); see also id. at 18 (referring 
to a suspect who is “detained pending an investigation” or “detained for 
investigatory purposes”). For further discussion of the impact of an 
arraignment on a pretrial detainee’s custodial status, see infra notes 183–196 
and accompanying text. 
 141. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 
08-680) (reporting that the Chief Justice also pointed out that the State was 
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Interestingly, the Chief Justice had particular expertise on 
this issue, as he had argued on behalf of the government in 
United States v. Green,142 when the Court first had the 
opportunity to consider limits on the duration of Edwards’s ban 
on interrogating suspects who have asked for a lawyer.143 
During the five-month gap in time between invoking his right to 
counsel on a drug charge and being questioned about a murder, 
Green had been in continuous detention, two months in pretrial 
detention and then three months awaiting sentencing following 
his guilty plea on the drug charge.144 Notably, the government 
conceded that Green was “‘in continuous custody’” during that 
five-month period.145 At oral argument, then-Deputy Solicitor 
General Roberts argued that Green’s guilty plea “dramatically” 
changed his status, but he contrasted “pretrial suspect[s]” who 
are in “the same position” when they assert the right to counsel 
and are later subject to further interrogation.146 Green was 
mentioned when Shatzer was litigated before the Court, and 
both the Solicitor General and the State of Maryland 
distinguished suspects like Shatzer who are serving prison time 
from those like Green who are detained “in connection with 
various pending charges.”147 
 
not contending otherwise). For other references to pretrial detention during 
the Shatzer oral argument, see id. at 23, 37, 49–50. 
 142. 507 U.S. 545 (1993); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, United 
States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545 (1993) (No. 91-1521) (indicating that John 
Roberts appeared as counsel representing the United States). 
 143. See Brief for the United States at 14 & n.4, Green, 507 U.S. 545 (No. 
91-1521). 
 144. See United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 985–86 (D.C. 1991), cert. 
granted, 504 U.S. 908 (1992), cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 545 (1993). 
 145. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 21 n.16, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 21 
n.16, Green, 592 A.2d 985 (No. 91-29)). 
 146. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Green, 507 U.S. 545 (No. 
91-1521). 
 147. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 21 n.6, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680); see Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 15–16, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (indicating that the Maryland 
State Attorney General distinguished pretrial detention and argued that 
Green turned on whether the break in custody started at the time of Green’s 
guilty plea or sentencing). 
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Finally, Justice Stevens’s separate opinion in Shatzer 
brought up the question of pretrial detention, suggesting that 
“the majority’s logic” would extend the break-in-custody 
exception to pretrial detainees who were held for a sufficient 
period of time to “become ‘accustomed’ to the detention 
facility.”148 While the majority responded to several objections 
Justice Stevens raised, it did not mention this particular 
point.149 Although the Court was therefore well aware of the 
issue of pretrial detention, the majority apparently saw no 
reason to modify the language in its opinion clearly limiting its 
holding to inmates serving a prison term. 
In addition to the repeated references in both Shatzer and 
Fields to convicted defendants, the Court’s rationales for 
concluding that Shatzer and Fields were not in custody are 
inapplicable to pretrial detainees who are undergoing 
interrogation. In finding that prisoners like Shatzer enjoy a 
break in custody when they return to the general prison 
population, the Court reasoned that they are no longer “isolated 
with their accusers.”150 Instead, they “return to their 
accustomed surroundings and routines” and “regain the degree 
of control they had over their lives.”151 Similarly, the Court’s 
opinion in Howes v. Fields explained that, unlike a suspect who 
is “abruptly transported from the street into a ‘police-dominated 
atmosphere,’” “the ordinary restrictions of prison life . . . are 
expected and familiar.”152 
Although the criminal charges about which Shatzer and 
Fields were questioned may not have contributed to any change 
in their day-to-day lives,153 other inmates serving prison 
sentences have been subjected to more onerous restraints 
because they were suspected of committing additional crimes: 
 
 148. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 128 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting id. at 113 (majority opinion)). 
 149. See id. at 114–17 (majority opinion). 
 150. Id. at 113. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
456 (1966)). 
 153. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 114 (noting that Shatzer did not claim he was 
“placed in a higher level of security or faced any continuing restraints” 
following his request for counsel at the first interrogation). 
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for example, they have been placed in segregation, sometimes 
for lengthy periods of time,154 or they have been transferred to a 
different cell155 or a more secure facility.156 When an inmate is 
suspected of committing a crime in prison, the questioning 
might be conducted by the very prison officials who “control the 
conditions of confinement.”157 And inmates who decline to be 
questioned may face discipline for “‘disobeying a direct order.’”158 
As the Solicitor General’s brief conceded in Fields, “coercive 
pressures” could arise when interrogators can “credibly 
threaten” more restrictive confinement conditions or prison 
rules punish a lack of cooperation with questioning.159 
Pretrial detainees are not only potentially subject to the 
same adverse consequences as convicted inmates serving prison 
time, but the Shatzer majority appropriately distinguished 
 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499, 504 (8th Cir. 
1998) (noting that the prisoner was transferred to a more secure prison and 
then placed in segregation); Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298, 300–01 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1991) (observing that the inmate was in segregation from the end of 
July until some point in the fall), vacated on other grounds, 875 P.2d 778 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994); People v. Patterson, 588 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (Ill. 1992) 
(pointing out that the prisoner was in segregation for six months); see also 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485–86 (1995) (holding that prison discipline 
“in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected 
parameters” of an inmate’s sentence, and that a thirty-day stay in segregation 
was not “the type of atypical, significant deprivation” needed to create a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 155. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 156. See, e.g., Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 504; cf. Schreane v. Ebbert, 864 
F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging that a detective may have 
promised he would try to assist the inmate’s transfer to another facility). 
 157. Reply Brief at 9, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680). For illustrations 
of such cases, see, for example, Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1489 (11th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Cooper, 800 F.2d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 971 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Scalf, 725 
F.2d 1272, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984); Patterson, 588 N.E.2d at 1177. 
 158. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 504 (quoting the pretrial hearing); cf. 
Patterson, 588 N.E.2d at 1181 (acknowledging that a guard could impose 
discipline, but finding no evidence that a ticket had been written in such 
situations). 
 159. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 24–25, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680); see Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 12–13, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680) (indicating that the State’s lawyer 
distinguished police officers who do not “have the ability to impact [an 
inmate’s] day-to-day prison life the way someone inside the prison would”). 
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sentenced prisoners from “the paradigm Edwards case,” where 
a suspect is “held in uninterrupted pretrial custody” and the 
crime for which she was arrested “is being actively 
investigated.”160 Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick exemplified 
that paradigmatic situation, the Shatzer Court continued, 
because the defendants in those three cases never “regained a 
sense of control or normalcy” after being taken into custody.161 
And that was true even though Edwards’s second interrogation 
and both of Minnick’s interrogations occurred not at the police 
station, but at the jail where they were being held.162 
Nevertheless, the Shatzer Court apparently considered those 
two defendants to be “isolated with their accusers” rather than 
“liv[ing] among other inmates, guards, and workers” at the 
jail.163 Shatzer’s treatment of the Edwards line of cases exposes 
the flaws in the lower court opinions that have found pretrial 
detainees were not in custody despite the fact that they had only 
been held overnight164 or were interviewed in a jail other than 
the one that had allegedly become their pretrial “home.”165 
One could, however, try to distinguish pretrial detainees 
who are being held long term because they have been denied bail 
or lack the resources to pay bail, either on the ground that their 
cases are no longer under active investigation or that the 
defendants in the three “paradigm” cases had only been held for 
a limited period of time, ranging from less than a day to three 
days.166 As for the first purported distinction, when questions 
surrounding limits on the duration of the Edwards ban first 
reached the Court in United States v. Green, then-Deputy 
 
 160. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010). 
 161. Id. at 107. 
 162. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148–49 (1990); Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981). 
 163. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. 
 164. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 165. Holland v. Rivard, 9 F. Supp. 3d 773, 787 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 166. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106–07. Likewise, the suspects in the Sixth 
Amendment cases discussed supra notes 127–133 had only been detained for 
a short period of time. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 781–82 (2009); 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173–74 (1991); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 
U.S. 285, 287–88 (1988); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 627–28 (1986); 
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 266 (1980). 
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Solicitor General John Roberts pointed out that “the 
investigative process” continues until a finding of guilt, when 
the defendant is “no longer a suspect” and instead has become 
“a convict.”167 Until a verdict is entered, the uncertainty pretrial 
detainees face about whether they will be convicted and of what 
charges makes them susceptible to the coercion Miranda 
warnings are designed to combat.168 
As for the second purported distinction, the government 
maintained that Green was in a different position than an 
arrestee who had “recently” undergone interrogation because, 
after five months of detention, he was not likely to believe that 
he was being “‘badgered’ by the police,” that they were not 
“serious” about his right to counsel, or that the interrogation 
session would last until he confessed.169 The Solicitor General’s 
brief in that case therefore concluded that the Edwards ban on 
interrogation should end after “a few days,” when pretrial 
detention is no longer based “simply . . . on the strength of [an] 
initial arrest.”170 At oral argument, then-Deputy Solicitor 
General Roberts claimed in response to questions from the 
bench that the Edwards prohibition should no longer apply after 
a month of pretrial detention but “probably” should still be in 
effect after only two days.171 And, in fact, some lower courts have 
suggested that, after some period of time, the Edwards 
protection disappears.172 
Although these cases involve the appropriate length of the 
Edwards ban and therefore are not directly on point, similar 
 
 167. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 9, United States v. Green, 507 
U.S. 545 (1993) (No. 91-1521); see Brief for the United States at 18, Green, 507 
U.S. 545 (No. 91-1521) (same). 
 168. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 114. 
 169. See Brief for the United States at 19–20, Green, 507 U.S. 545 (No. 
91-1521). 
 170. Id. at 21–22. 
 171. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Green, 507 U.S. 545 (No. 91-1521). 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 905 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(three months); State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah 1984) (same). But 
see Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298, 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (Edwards ban 
remained in effect one year later), vacated on other grounds, 875 P.2d 778 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994); State v. Wint, 198 A.3d 963, 980–81 (N.J. 2018) 
(holding that a six-month pre-indictment pretrial detention did not constitute 
a break in custody, but leaving open whether the Edwards ban is “eternal”). 
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reasoning could be used to support the argument that pretrial 
detention eventually loses its custodial status. Determining 
precisely when pretrial detainees become “accustomed” to their 
surroundings obviously creates a difficult line-drawing 
challenge, whether it is the three days in Roberson,173 nine or 
ten days,174 one or two months,175 five or six months,176 a year,177 
or several years.178 Green may have become “familiar” with the 
limitations on his freedom after five months, as the government 
argued,179 but it not apparent why a week or a month of 
detention would have sufficed. And, while some detainees can 
remain in jail for long periods of time,180 the average length of 
pretrial detention is only twenty-five days.181 Moreover, even if 
 
 173. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) (noting that 
Roberson was “still in custody”). 
 174. See Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 776 & n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) 
(finding that the defendant was “clearly in custody”). 
 175. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 566–67 (1987) (noting that a 
pretrial detainee was given Miranda warnings when questioned in jail about 
two months after his arrest); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467–68 (1981) 
(finding that a pretrial detainee was in custody when questioned seven weeks 
following his indictment); People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 639–40 (Cal. 2019) 
(holding that the defendant was in custody after five weeks of pretrial 
detention). 
 176. Compare Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 282–84 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2017) (concluding that almost five months’ pretrial detention 
constituted a break in custody), with Wint, 198 A.3d at 980 (holding that a 
six-month pre-indictment detention was not a break in custody), and Trotter 
v. United States, 121 A.3d 40, 48–49 (D.C. 2015) (finding that five months of 
pretrial detention was not a break in custody). 
 177. See Champney, 161 A.3d at 269 (noting that the defendant was held 
in pretrial detention for more than a year). 
 178. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 
2014), https://perma.cc/64V5-3DMF (describing the story of Kalief Browder, a 
sixteen-year-old who was held in pretrial detention at Rikers Island for three 
years, almost two of which were in solitary confinement, before charges that 
he stole a backpack and its contents were dismissed); Pretrial Injustice, 
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://perma.cc/R6UA-MCPY (discussing a similar case 
involving Ralph Berry, a teenager held in pretrial detention for three years for 
a murder he did not commit). 
 179. Reply Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Green, 507 
U.S. 545 (1993) (No. 91-1521). 
 180. See, e.g., Wint, 198 A.3d at 981 (noting that pretrial detention can 
extend for years). 
 181. See ZENG, supra note 1, at 8. 
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pretrial detainees become somewhat adjusted to their 
surroundings after some period of time, the Court acknowledged 
in Shatzer that custody’s coercive “pressure [is] likely to 
‘increase as custody is prolonged.’”182 
Shortly following arrest, a detainee must be taken to court 
for an initial arraignment,183 thereby starting adversary judicial 
proceedings and triggering the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.184 Some judges and litigants have suggested that an 
arraignment or an indictment, which likewise triggers the Sixth 
Amendment,185 may end the Edwards protection and, again, a 
similar argument could be made about the detainee’s custodial 
status.186 The Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Shatzer 
distinguished “a prearraignment detainee” from a convicted 
prisoner,187 and the District of Columbia’s amicus brief in Green 
likewise described the three talismanic Edwards cases as 
involving “pre-arraignment questioning.”188 Admittedly, none of 
those three defendants had appeared before a magistrate when 
they made their confessions,189 but the briefs offered no 
explanation why the onset of adversary judicial proceedings 
should make a difference for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
 
 182. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 (2010) (quoting Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)). 
 183. See LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.2(i), at 15 (noting that the first 
appearance is usually required within twenty-four or forty-eight hours after 
arrest). 
 184. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). 
 185. See id. at 198. 
 186. Cf. State v. Wint, 198 A.3d 963, 980 (N.J. 2018) (holding that 
“pre-indictment” pretrial detention does not constitute a break in custody). 
 187. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 20, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680); see Brief for the United States at 22, 
United States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545 (1993) (No. 91-1521) (referring to a 
suspect who is detained only “on the strength of his initial arrest”). 
 188. Brief of the District of Columbia, Amicus Curiae, in Support of 
Reversal at 8, Green, 507 U.S. 545 (No. 91-1521). 
 189. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678 (1988) (noting that 
Roberson was “still in custody pursuant to the arrest” three days later); id. at 
692 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that the Sixth Amendment did not 
“control” that case); Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 83 (Miss. 1988) (linking 
Minnick’s Sixth Amendment argument to the issuance of an arrest warrant, 
which triggered his Sixth Amendment right to counsel only under state law), 
rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
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According to the Court’s Sixth Amendment case law, a 
“formal . . . commitment to prosecute” turns the government’s 
“relationship” with the detainee into a “solidly adversarial” one: 
the detainee is now “‘faced with the prosecutorial forces of 
organized society’” and “‘immersed in the intricacies’” of 
criminal law.190 But, as that description suggests, rather than 
making detainees feel more comfortable, the filing of formal 
charges presumably serves to heighten their anxiety about the 
future and the potential for coerciveness. It is not obvious why 
Roberson’s susceptibility to coercion would have been reduced if, 
in the three-day interval between his invocation of the right to 
counsel and his re-interrogation, he had appeared in court for 
the typically “quite brief” first appearance, during which a judge 
explained the charges, his rights, and the next step in the 
process and then either denied bail or set it at a level he could 
not afford.191 In fact, in discussing the protection offered by the 
Edwards line of cases, the Court in Montejo properly saw no 
reason to distinguish between pre- and post-arraignment 
questioning.192 
Moreover, the “relationship” between the government and 
the detainee is not fixed with the commencement of adversary 
judicial proceedings, as additional and more serious charges 
could still be filed. In Texas v. Cobb,193 for example, Cobb was 
indicted for burglarizing a home but was ultimately charged 
with murdering two of its residents.194 And the triggering of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not mean a pretrial 
detainee has ready access to legal advice. Counsel might not be 
appointed for weeks or months,195 and a detainee who has 
 
 190. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 207, 202, 198 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)). 
 191. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.2(i), at 15. 
 192. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 795 (2009) (reasoning that if 
the Edwards line of cases adequately safeguards a suspect’s right to counsel 
during questioning before arraignment, “it is hard to see why it would not also 
suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment”). 
 193. 532 U.S. 162 (2001). 
 194. Id. at 164–65. For additional examples, see infra note 235 and 
accompanying text. 
 195. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213 (leaving open whether a six-month 
delay in appointing counsel violated the Sixth Amendment); Douglas L. 
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received appointed counsel may not have much contact with the 
lawyer even after months of pretrial detention.196 
Even if pretrial detention becomes a suspect’s new normal 
after some period of time, the other rationales the Court 
advanced to support the results in Shatzer and Fields 
demonstrate that detainees do not enjoy the same “sense of 
control” as sentenced prisoners.197 In both of those cases, the 
Court explained that the officials who questioned Shatzer and 
Howes had no authority to increase the prison terms imposed at 
sentencing, and therefore the inmates’ “continued 
detention . . . did not depend on what [they] said (or did not say)” 
during the interrogation session.198 
That assertion is debatable even with respect to sentenced 
inmates. Fields, for example, was serving a forty-five-day 
sentence on a minor disorderly conduct charge when he was 
interrogated about a child sexual abuse offense that ultimately 
led to a prison term of ten to fifteen years.199 Even if Fields saw 
no connection between his interrogators and his jailers—and it 
is not obvious that is true, given that a corrections officer from 
the jail escorted him to the sheriff’s department for questioning 
without telling him where he was going, the sheriff’s 
department was located in another part of the same building as 
the jail, and Fields thought the deputies who questioned him 
 
Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 337, 
432– 53 (2011) (documenting the length of delay in different states). 
 196. See Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 724 (Pa. 2016) 
(describing claims that defendants often did not meet their public defenders 
until just before the preliminary hearing and usually did not hear from their 
attorneys in the three months between the preliminary hearing and the status 
conference or between the status conference and the pretrial hearing); 
BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 7 (observing that pretrial detainees encounter 
difficulties consulting with their lawyers and their communications may be 
disclosed to prosecutors); Wiseman, supra note 10, at 246–47 (discussing 
pretrial detainees’ lack of access to legal counsel and research materials). 
 197. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 107 (2010). 
 198. Id. at 114; see Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 512 (2012) (noting that 
prisoners understand that police officers “probably lack the authority to affect 
the duration” of their sentences). 
 199. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 2, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680). 
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might return him to his cell200—any hopes he had for reducing 
his disorderly conduct sentence presumably paled in comparison 
to his concerns about the consequences of the potential charges 
his interrogators were investigating.201 
Regardless of the relative severity of the crime of conviction 
and the subject of the interrogation, for all convicted prisoners, 
as the Shatzer Court recognized, “the possibility of parole [may] 
exist[].”202 Shatzer’s assertion in response—that the questioner 
has “no apparent power to decrease the time served”—was not 
accompanied by any explanation or support.203 The Justices 
equivocated on this a bit in Fields, commenting that the officers 
conducting the interrogation there “probably” had no authority 
“to bring about an early release,” but again were only able to cite 
Shatzer for support.204 In fact, however, prisoners have been 
promised early release and even released on probation to assist 
with law enforcement investigations,205 and Shatzer’s 
cooperation with the police could have been considered in 
determining his eligibility for parole under Maryland 
regulations taking into account a prisoner’s “adjustment” and 
“attitude toward society . . . and other authority.”206 In addition 
to affecting the likelihood of parole, a prisoner’s cooperation with 
 
 200. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 502, 516 n.6; Brief for the Respondent at 38, 
Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680). 
 201. See Dery, supra note 19, at 91 (calling the Fields Court’s reasoning 
“technically true but, in the bigger picture, irrelevant”). 
 202. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. 
 203. Id. at 113–14. 
 204. Fields, 565 U.S. at 512. 
 205. See, e.g., Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst., 651 F. App’x 344, 
355 (6th Cir. 2016); Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(also pointing out that the defendant’s lack of cooperation led to his arrest for 
failing to comply with the terms of his probation), vacated on other grounds 
sub nom. Sheets v. Simpson, 565 U.S. 1232 (2012); see also Brief for Donovan 
E. Simpson as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24 n.8, Fields, 565 
U.S. 499 (No. 10-680) (citing other cases in which a prisoner was released early 
or promised a letter to the parole board in exchange for cooperating with the 
authorities). 
 206. MD. CODE REGS. 12.08.01.18(A)(3) (2008), cited in Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 
127–28 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see Brief for Respondent at 
26, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (noting that interrogators could 
recommend a cooperating prisoner’s release on parole). 
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an interrogation could influence a prosecutor’s response to the 
inmate’s motion to reduce or modify her sentence.207 
But, even if the Court’s observations are taken at face value 
with respect to prisoners already serving a sentence, they are 
inapplicable to pretrial detainees, who may feel coerced to 
respond to questioning by “‘the fear of reprisal’” or “‘the hope 
of . . . more lenient treatment.’”208 The State of Maryland 
appropriately distinguished Shatzer from a pretrial detainee, 
“‘worried and uncertain about his fate with regard 
to . . . pending charges.’”209 During oral argument in that case, 
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Shatzer’s attorney that a 
break-in-custody exception should not apply to pretrial 
detainees because they realize they are still “being looked at” for 
the crime that led to their invocation of the right to counsel.210 
The Solicitor General likewise acknowledged in Fields that a 
pretrial detainee is “differently situated” from an inmate 
serving a prison term because the former “can easily imagine 
that his continued incarceration, and what charges he faces, 
may be affected by whether he cooperates with authorities.”211 
In fact, pretrial detainees are frequently told that 
cooperating with their interrogators could be beneficial.212 In 
 
 207. See Brief for Respondent at 26, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) 
(pointing out that a prisoner’s unopposed motion to modify or reduce a 
sentence “could result in a shorter sentence”). 
 208. Fields, 565 U.S. at 512 (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 
296– 97 (1990)). 
 209. Brief for Petitioner at 24, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (quoting 
Magid, supra note 75, at 948); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Shatzer, 
559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (quoting the Maryland Attorney General 
distinguishing Shatzer from a pretrial detainee, who has “different incentives 
to cooperate or not cooperate with the police”); see also Brief of Florida et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 
08-680) (arguing the same point on behalf of thirty-seven states). 
 210. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680). 
 211. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 24 n.1, Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (No. 10-680). 
 212. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 186 n.1 (1991) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the pretrial detainee was told that “‘tell[ing] his 
side of the story’ . . . might help him later”); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
479 (1981) (reporting that the interrogator gave the suspect an opportunity to 
call the prosecutor to try to work out a deal); United States v. Coles, 264 F. 
Supp. 3d 667, 684 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (acknowledging that the interrogators 
“repeatedly insisted” they could help the pretrial detainee “alleviate his 
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addition, incriminating statements made by pretrial detainees 
during questioning have been considered in setting bail and 
imposing sentence,213 and detainees may believe—with good 
reason—that prosecutors play a role in recommending pretrial 
detention conditions to the trial judge.214 
Once adversary judicial proceedings have begun, law 
enforcement officials who wish to interrogate a suspect without 
administering Miranda warnings215 will need to limit their 
questions to charges other than the one for which the suspect is 
being detained because, unlike the Miranda right to counsel, the 
 
exposure”); State v. Ames, 155 A.3d 881, 887 n.3, 884 (Me. 2017) (observing 
that the detectives suggested that the pretrial detainee’s cooperation could 
have an impact on his probation revocation proceedings and that a crime tied 
to a drug problem could lead to a lesser sentence); State v. Baker, No. 9-12-51, 
2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1621, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2013) (pointing out 
that the pretrial detainee was told that talking to the detective “might ‘help 
his situation’”); Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 274 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2017) (noting that a police officer informed the pretrial detainee that 
another suspect was “‘clearing . . . his slate by offering information’” and 
encouraged him to “‘step up’ and discuss his involvement” (citation omitted)); 
cf. Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518, 527 (Mo. 2012) (explaining that defense 
counsel hoped that a social worker who questioned the pretrial detainee during 
a competency evaluation would testify for the defense at the death penalty 
sentencing hearing). For cases where similar comments were made to inmates 
serving prison sentences, see, for example, Schreane v. Ebbert, 864 F.3d 446, 
449 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that a detective promised to inform the prosecutor 
that the prisoner “had come forward on his own and cooperated with the 
police”); Georgison v. Donelli, 588 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 2009) (indicating that 
detectives asked the inmate whether he wanted to know what impact his 
confession would have on charges he committed an unrelated crime). 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 430 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 214. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Champney, 161 A.3d at 283 n.23. For discussion of ways in which prosecutors 
can influence the length and conditions of pretrial detention, see infra notes 
226, 233–234 and accompanying text. 
 215. Cf. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298–99 (1988) (holding that a 
Miranda waiver generally suffices to waive the Sixth Amendment as well). But 
see Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Confessions Obtained in Violation of the 
Fifth Amendment from Those Obtained in Violation of the Sixth Amendment, 
50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 145, 152 (2017) (criticizing Patterson for focusing on the 
Fifth Amendment’s interest in dissipating “coercion” and ignoring the Sixth 
Amendment’s distinct concern with addressing defendants’ “ignorance”); 
Wayne A. Logan, The Case for Greater Transparency in Sixth Amendment 
Right to Pretrial Counsel Warnings, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23, 36 (2019) 
(agreeing that Patterson “both understated and misstated” a lawyer’s 
“role . . . in the post-critical stage context”). 
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Sixth Amendment is “offense specific”216 and prohibits 
“deliberately elicit[ing]” a confession only to the charged 
offense.217 In cases where law enforcement officials suspect 
pretrial detainees of committing other crimes and can therefore 
interrogate about those charges without running afoul of the 
Sixth Amendment, prosecutors might claim that those officers 
do not control decisions about the defendants’ “continued 
detention,”218 especially if the unrelated charges are being 
investigated by a different law enforcement agency.219 Just like 
convicted prisoners, the argument might go, the detainees may 
realize they “will remain under confinement” regardless of how 
cooperative they are during the interrogation.220 
But other portions of the Court’s reasoning in Shatzer 
distinguish those pretrial detainees from convicted offenders. 
The detainees face continued “uncertainties” surrounding what 
“final charges” will be brought and what sentence will be 
imposed if they are convicted—with respect to both the charges 
for which they are being detained and the other crimes that are 
the subject of interrogation.221 And again, as the Shatzer Court 
observed, “‘prolonged police custody’” is likely to create 
“mounting coercive pressures.”222 
In addition, the argument about split lines of authority is 
less persuasive when the same police department responsible 
for bringing the initial charges is investigating a pretrial 
detainee’s potential involvement in other offenses.223 Under 
 
 216. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. But cf. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 
683 (1988) (holding that invocations of the Miranda right to counsel foreclose 
questioning on any charge). 
 217. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); cf. Texas v. Cobb, 
532 U.S. 162, 173 (2001) (holding that the Sixth Amendment also attaches as 
to any crime that would be considered the same offense under the double 
jeopardy test articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932)). 
 218. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 114 (2010). 
 219. But cf. infra note 225 (citing sources making this argument even 
though the same law enforcement agency was investigating both offenses). 
 220. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012). 
 221. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 114. 
 222. Id. at 105 (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988)). 
 223. For illustrations of such cases, see Holland v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 224, 
227–29 (6th Cir. 2015); People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 622 (Cal. 2019); Trotter 
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those circumstances, the detainee’s “continued detention as [a] 
suspect[]” does “rest[] with” the interrogating officers and the 
prosecutors with whom they work,224 just as it did for the three 
defendants in the Edwards line of cases.225 Prosecutors can 
make decisions about whether to file a motion to increase the 
money bail or change the bail conditions, or how to respond to 
defense counsel’s motion to reduce the amount of bail, based on 
how cooperative the detainee has been in questioning.226 
Moreover, treating interrogations of pretrial detainees 
differently depending on which jurisdiction their questioners 
represent creates too fine a distinction, especially when the 
controlling point of view is that of the reasonable person in the 
detainee’s position.227 The reasonable suspect likely does not 
distinguish between distinct law enforcement agencies, instead 
viewing them as a united entity.228 Minnick, for example, was 
questioned at a California jail, first by FBI agents and then 
several days later by a deputy sheriff from Mississippi.229 Both 
interrogations discussed Minnick’s escape from a Mississippi 
 
v. United States, 121 A.3d 40, 46–47 (D.C. 2015); State v. Ames, 155 A.3d 881, 
883–84 (Me. 2017); People v. Elliott, 833 N.W.2d 284, 286–88 (Mich. 2013); 
State v. Pehowic, 780 A.2d 1289, 1290–91 (N.H. 2001); Commonwealth v. 
Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 268–69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017); Jones v. State, 119 
S.W.3d 766, 770–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
 224. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 114. 
 225. But see Champney, 161 A.3d at 283 n.22, 284 (reasoning that the 
pretrial detainee was “far removed” from the interrogating officer in the time 
between interrogations and the officer had no “ability to reward . . . or punish” 
the detainee, whose detention was based on unrelated charges being 
investigated by the same law enforcement agency); Brief for the United States 
at 22–23, United States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545 (1993) (No. 91-1521) (arguing 
that Edwards should not ban interrogation about a different crime being 
investigated by the same authorities if the suspect had been assigned counsel). 
 226. See generally Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 362 (1971) (pointing out 
the availability of such motions); Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 363–64 
(1958) (noting that the amount of money bail fluctuated between $7,500 and 
$50,000 in that case). For discussion of other ways in which prosecutors can 
influence the length and conditions of pretrial detention, see infra notes 
233– 234 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(wondering how convicted prisoners are “supposed to know” their “fate is not 
controlled” by police interrogators). 
 229. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148–49 (1990). 
PRETRIAL CUSTODY AND MIRANDA 765 
 
jail and the two murders for which he was ultimately 
convicted.230 On each occasion, jail officials informed Minnick 
that he was required to go to the interviews.231 From where 
Minnick sat, then, it could reasonably appear that three 
different law enforcement authorities—the FBI, the Mississippi 
sheriff’s office, and his California jailers—were all working 
collectively in putting together a murder case against him.232 
Neither the language appearing in the Shatzer and Fields 
opinions nor the reasoning used to justify the results in those 
cases supports extending the Court’s rulings to pretrial 
detainees, regardless of the length of their detention, the onset 
of adversary judicial proceedings, or the subject of the 
interrogation. The next Part of the Article considers whether the 
relevant policy considerations dictate a different conclusion. 
III. THE COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Even if Supreme Court precedent does not definitively 
foreclose prosecutors from claiming that questioning of pretrial 
detainees is noncustodial, the policy concerns underlying 
Miranda and its progeny call for that result. Because of the 
continuous uncertainty facing pretrial detainees and their 
susceptibility to coercion, these defendants should be deemed to 
be in custody for the duration of their confinement prior to trial. 
Extending Fields and Shatzer to the pretrial detention 
context would allow government officials to engage in 
manipulation so as to circumvent Miranda and enhance their 
ability to interrogate without administering warnings. They 
could ask judges to deny bail or impose onerous bail conditions 
to increase the likelihood of extended pretrial detention.233 They 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.; see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981) (noting that a 
guard at the jail told Edwards he had to talk to the detectives who had come 
to interview him). 
 232. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(pointing out that it “will ‘appear’” to a prisoner that the guards and police are 
“not independent” when a jailer says the inmate is required to talk to police). 
For the argument that Fields may have had a similar impression, see supra 
note 200 and accompanying text. 
 233. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(acknowledging that detainees might reasonably believe that “the authorities” 
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could influence the length and conditions of pretrial detention 
by adding or dropping charges or requesting continuances of the 
detainee’s trial date.234 They could charge a suspect with a 
minor crime and then conduct repeated interrogations on the 
charge they are really investigating, a more serious offense for 
which the detainee’s Sixth Amendment rights have not yet 
attached.235 They could resort to a form of “catch and release,” 
conducting custodial interrogations and then promising to bring 
any pretrial detainee who invoked the Miranda right to counsel 
back for another round of questioning every fourteen days.236 
Requiring police to administer Miranda warnings before 
 
play some role in recommending pretrial conditions to judges); BAUGHMAN, 
supra note 7, at 6–7 (noting that prosecutors are incentivized to seek high bail 
amounts); EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM 
AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 39 (2019) (reporting 
that judges typically follow prosecutors’ bail recommendations); Lauryn P. 
Gouldin, Reforming Pretrial Decision-Making, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 857, 
868 (2020) (observing that judges enjoy “almost unreviewable discretion” in 
making bail decisions). 
 234. See, e.g., Gonnerman, supra note 178 (noting that prosecutors 
repeatedly requested short continuances in Kalief Browder’s case, which led 
to at least a six-week delay each time because of the court’s crowded dockets); 
Pretrial Injustice, supra note 178 (pointing out that Ralph Berry’s trial was 
similarly delayed). 
 235. See Magid, supra note 75, at 889 (endorsing “this much applauded 
policy”). For possible examples of such cases, see People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 
609, 622, 640 (Cal. 2019) (noting that the defendant was arrested for violating 
his parole by possessing a BB gun and consuming alcohol, but it was “difficult 
to separate his jailed status” from two murder investigations); People v. 
Elliott, 833 N.W.2d 284, 286–87 (Mich. 2013) (observing that the questioning 
conducted on the day the defendant was arrested for a parole violation 
involved an unrelated robbery); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 771, 786 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2003) (pointing out that, while the defendant was arrested for 
possessing a controlled substance and failing to pay various traffic fines, he 
was questioned about the murder of a woman whose body had been found 
earlier that day); see also Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 182–83 (2001) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for allowing police to evade the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by “asking questions about any other related 
crime not actually charged in [an] indictment,” and listing by way of example 
the different charges that could be brought against an armed robber or drug 
dealer). 
 236. Cf. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110–11 (adopting a fourteen-day 
break-in-custody rule to discourage such tactics). For an illustration of a case 
involving such a promise, see State v. Baker, No. 9-12-51, 2013 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1621, at *9–10 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2013). 
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interrogating pretrial detainees would disincentivize these 
forms of gamesmanship. 
On the other side, some have argued that considering 
pretrial detainees to be in continuous custody would be 
tantamount to affording them “immunity from questioning”237 
and thus more robust Fifth Amendment protection than 
nonincarcerated individuals.238 It seems somewhat 
counterintuitive to view someone in jail awaiting trial as 
occupying a privileged position given the significant personal, 
financial, and legal costs of pretrial detention.239 Moreover, jails 
have been described as “worse places” than even prisons.240 Jail 
inmates are “more likely to be in some kind of crisis,” and jails 
are “far less professionalized” and more financially strapped 
than prisons.241 In addition, jail can be more dangerous than 
prison because the rates of turnover are very high,242 jailers 
often lack information about their detainees,243 and those who 
are held without bail may tend to be more dangerous 
offenders.244 
 
 237. Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 283 n.22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2017). 
 238. See, e.g., Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2007); cf. Magid, supra note 75, at 889 (making this argument in proposing a 
limit on the Edwards ban for pretrial detainees). 
 239. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
 240. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1687 
(2003). 
 241. Id. at 1687, 1684–85. 
 242. See id. at 1686; Struve, supra note 3, at 1055; see also ZENG, supra 
note 1, at 8 (reporting that the average weekly turnover rate in jails was 55 
percent in 2018). 
 243. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 336 (2012) 
(noting that arrestees can misrepresent their identity or provide false 
identification and jailers might not be able to obtain complete criminal history 
records). 
 244. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (observing that 
bail is denied in federal cases only when suspects charged with “extremely 
serious offenses” are proven by clear and convincing evidence to pose “a 
demonstrable danger to the community”); Struve, supra note 3, at 1059 (noting 
that most states likewise permit pretrial detention of dangerous defendants 
and tend to detain those who are more likely to endanger the community). But 
cf. BAUGHMAN, supra note 7, at 39–42, 75–76 (charging that judges, who must 
often make bail determinations quickly with very little information, are 
“substantially mistaken” in predicting which suspects are likely to be 
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The seemingly obvious response to the immunity argument 
is that any detainee can be interrogated after receiving Miranda 
warnings. But others have offered the more nuanced objection 
that government officials should not be required to administer 
Miranda warnings whenever they wish to pose a question to a 
detainee.245 That concern might carry some weight in reference 
to inmates serving a prison sentence, who would become 
“unapproachable for the duration of their often lengthy 
incarceration.”246 But almost all prison sentences are longer 
than a year,247 and, as noted above, pretrial detention is 
typically much shorter.248 
Moreover, Miranda warnings are triggered by the 
combination of custody and interrogation, and therefore need 
not be given before “informal conversations”249 with pretrial 
detainees that are not “reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response” under the Rhode Island v. Innis250 
 
dangerous); COHEN & REAVES, supra note 5, at 1 (reporting that only one-sixth 
of pretrial detainees were denied bail and the rest were unable to post bail); 
Mayson, supra note 9, at 1649 (contrasting the atypical “explicit denial of bail” 
and the common “functional denial of bail” (emphasis omitted)); Samuel R. 
Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 422 (2016) (pointing out 
that judges “have reason to err on the side of detention” and are “far more 
likely to detain or set a high bail requirement than one might expect from the 
text of the statutes passed”). 
 245. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 738 A.2d 937, 943 (N.H. 1999); Herrera v. 
State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 246. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 20, Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) (No. 08-680). This appears to 
be a familiar refrain coming out of the Solicitor General’s office. See, e.g., Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25–26, Howes 
v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012) (No. 10-680); Brief for the United States at 
24– 25, United States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545 (1993) (No. 91-1521); Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, 11 n.3, 
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (No. 88-1972); Brief for the United 
States at 21, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 726). It has also 
been echoed by some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 
972–73 (4th Cir. 1985); People v. Patterson, 588 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ill. 1992). 
 247. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 
253516, PRISONERS IN 2018, at 6 (putting the figure at 97 percent). 
 248. See supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text. 
 249. United States v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., 
concurring). 
 250. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
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definition of interrogation.251 Although Innis also included 
“express questioning” within the realm of interrogation,252 some 
courts have exempted spontaneous questions on the ground that 
they fall within Miranda’s exception for “[g]eneral on-the-scene 
questioning.”253 Even if a jailer’s innocent question such as 
“What’s going on here?” is considered to be interrogation,254 the 
guard can Mirandize the detainee before continuing the 
questioning and then argue that any subsequent confession is 
untainted by the Miranda violation and thus admissible under 
Oregon v. Elstad.255 That claim would be even stronger if the 
follow-up interrogation session was conducted by different jail 
personnel in another location and after some gap in time.256 
 
 251. Id. at 301 (defining the “functional equivalent” of “express 
questioning”). 
 252. Id. at 300–01. 
 253. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). For illustrations of such 
cases, see United States v. Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 254. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 92, § 6.7(b), at 844–45, 854–58 (describing 
the conflict in the lower courts on this question). 
 255. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (refusing to apply the 
fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude a second confession that was 
voluntary and followed proper Miranda warnings); cf. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 
U.S. 600, 614–16 (2004) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing Elstad from a 
bad-faith violation intended to circumvent Miranda); id. at 620–22 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (same). 
 256. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615–16 (plurality opinion) (refusing to apply 
Elstad where both interrogations were conducted by the same officer at the 
same time and place); cf. id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(suggesting that similar factors should be taken into account in consecutive 
confession cases involving bad-faith violations of Miranda). For lower court 
opinions addressing this issue in the context of pretrial detention, see, for 
example, United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 409–10 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(distinguishing a guard’s “on-the-spot inquiry,” and declining to apply Elstad 
where the initial Miranda violation was “neither technical nor mitigated by an 
intervening warning”); People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 644, 646 (Cal. 2019) 
(refusing to suppress a pretrial detainee’s subsequent statements where the 
un-Mirandized interrogation was short and did not involve a deliberate 
Miranda violation and the second “detailed” confession came after a “change 
of setting”); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 774–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) 
(finding Elstad inapplicable where the Miranda violation “reflect[ed], at the 
very least, a serious misunderstanding . . . of the dictates of Miranda” and “the 
unwarned and warned statements . . . were given during a nearly 
undifferentiated single event”). 
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Finally, some object that incarcerated individuals are often 
transferred to different facilities, and a government official may 
not realize a prisoner previously invoked the Miranda right to 
counsel and therefore inadvertently violate the Edwards rule.257 
Again, this argument has greater force for those serving a prison 
sentence than for those awaiting trial. Even the Solicitor 
General’s amicus brief in Shatzer distinguished requiring 
government officials to determine whether a pretrial detainee 
invoked the right to counsel “at some point in the relatively 
recent past” from the more burdensome task of ascertaining 
whether an inmate “serving a long prison sentence” previously 
asked for a lawyer “at any time, in any place, and to any law 
enforcement official during a period of continuous 
incarceration.”258 As the Court recognized in Arizona v. 
Roberson, an officer’s “lack of diligence” in following “established 
procedures” and confirming whether a pretrial detainee 
previously requested counsel can have “no significance.”259 
In short, while countervailing policy arguments can be 
made, the ones on the government’s side of the equation are 
much less weighty when directed at pretrial detainees rather 
than convicted inmates serving prison time. And those 
objections are outbalanced by the specter of government officials 
using manipulative tactics to circumvent Miranda should the 
rulings in Shatzer and Fields be extended to cases involving 
pretrial detainees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Maryland v. Shatzer and 
especially in Howes v. Fields—that Shatzer experienced a break 
in custody when he returned to the general prison population 
following an interrogation session and that Fields was not in 
 
 257. See, e.g., Shatzer v. State, 954 A.2d 1118, 1153 (Md. 2008) (Harrell, 
J., dissenting), rev’d, 559 U.S. 98 (2010); Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, 
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) (No. 08-680) (reporting the argument 
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675, 687–88 (1988) (rejecting a good-faith exception to Edwards). 
 258. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 20, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680). 
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custody when he was questioned for many hours, not in the 
prison where he was incarcerated, but in the sheriff’s office—are 
certainly subject to criticism. But, consistent with the Justices’ 
repeated assumption in other confessions cases that pretrial 
detention constitutes custody for purposes of Miranda, the 
Court carefully limited the language in both Shatzer and Fields 
to inmates serving prison sentences. Likewise, the reasoning 
underlying the two opinions is not easily transferred to pretrial 
detainees. 
Despite the Court’s gradual retreat from defendant-friendly 
language in its earlier opinions addressing claims that a 
prisoner’s Miranda rights were violated, the holdings in Shatzer 
and Fields should not be extended to the pretrial detention 
context. Until pretrial detainees go to trial, they face a constant 
state of uncertainty about the future, accompanied by fear, 
anxiety, hope, and a susceptibility to coercion. Pretrial detainees 
should therefore be deemed to be in Miranda custody during the 
duration of their confinement prior to trial. Any other result will 
allow gamesmanship on the part of prosecutors in making 
charging decisions and bail recommendations and will enable 
law enforcement to capitalize on the coerciveness of pretrial 
detention to elicit confessions from suspects who are 
particularly susceptible to the threats and promises that lead to 
false confessions and who disproportionately represent 
communities of color and financially vulnerable populations. 
 
